

**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee**

SECOM-D-080

10 March 1982

file 3-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, DCI Security Committee

FROM:

[Redacted]

Chairman

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures

1. The progress of our Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee will be expedited if the SECOM can provide them general guidance.

2. There are several basics we should have addressed long ago. The attached paper defines current policy, practices or procedures as I see them, along with some suggested changes. There may be others you have in mind that we should address.

3. Let us agree or agree to disagree on these at the 21 March SECOM meeting, and provide the results to the UDIS for implementation..



Attachment

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Community Procedures for Dealing with Unauthorized Disclosures

The current status and proposed changes on various aspects of the subject include the following:

1. Current Status: Each department and agency is responsible for the protection of classified intelligence within its custody. If the material is disclosed, the holding agency is responsible for investigation and corrective measures.

Proposed Change: None

2. Current Status: In the event of a disclosure of intelligence material held in common by two or more agencies, the originating agency is considered to have primary responsibility for the investigation. It is the responsibility of appropriate authority in the receiving agency(ies) to determine whether and how they will respond to a request for assistance in the form of internal investigation. The Community has not defined what is an adequate scope of investigation in response to such a request. As things now stand, requesting agencies are rarely provided detailed reports of investigation in cases of this type.

Proposed Change: The Community define what is an adequate investigation in response to a request by an originating agency, and agree that the results of such investigations will be provided to requestors.

3. Current Status: There is a growing practice of referring leaks to the Department of Justice and requesting FBI investigation.

Proposed Change: The Department of Justice should continue to be informed of leaks. Investigative assistance of the FBI should be requested only after completion of internal investigations, and then only if there are unresolved leads in areas that Community agencies have no authority to investigate. Both Department of Justice and the FBI should be expected to conduct and report to the originating agency the results of internal investigations if intelligence they hold was leaked and they were asked by the originator to investigate.

4. Current Status: Each department and agency unilaterally determines and makes referrals to the Department of Justice on unauthorized disclosures of classified material, including intelligence material. This raises Community concerns about competition for limited FBI resources, and leaves to Justice the resolution of priorities.

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Proposed Change: Community members agree to segregate disclosures of national foreign intelligence and provide them for referral by the DCI. While this would not eliminate concerns about competition for FBI assistance, it would permit the DCI to prioritize intelligence leaks.

5. Current Status: There are no formally acknowledged contact points within the Community for requesting investigations of leaks of commonly held material. The system essentially depends upon the "old-boy" network. There are no agreed procedures that requestors can depend upon to satisfy their requests or to determine if they have been denied.

Proposed Change: Each Community department or agency identify to others a contact point and establish internal procedures to address and reply to requests for investigation of leaks. Contact officers should have rapid access to appropriate authority for determination of action and be able to task adequate resources to respond to all accepted requests.

6. Current Status: The Community has signalled mixed reactions on the desirability of a central data base of leaks. Both CIA and DIA have offered ADP assistance. The UDIS has long debated content and format. Common forms are now ready for use. There is no agreement on who will compile the data base.

Proposed Change: The Community adopt the use of the forms and the UDIS Chairman be designated to collect them and start development of a data base.

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